

US Hegemony in Korean Studies and the Soviet Role in Early Postwar Korea

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Abstract

This paper examines some of the ways the US-centric framework of Anglophone Korean studies has distorted scholarship on post-colonial Korean history. First, an over-emphasis on the American role in the division of Korea has exaggerated the possibility that the US and USSR could have compromised to create a unified government for the peninsula. The Soviet documentary record reveals that Moscow was determined to obstruct such an outcome if it endangered Soviet security. Second, by focusing on the serious damage the American occupation inflicted on the South, scholars have understated the control Soviet occupation authorities exercised in the North. The resulting over-estimation of Korean agency in the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has obscured the driving force behind the North's Juche ideology. From the late 1950s the DPRK leadership was driven primarily by resentment of Soviet and Chinese domination. Soviet bloc documents reveal that during the war of 1950–53 both Stalin and Mao Zedong demanded that Kim Il Sung sacrifice the physical existence of the DPRK for the sake of Soviet and Chinese aims.

Keywords: Postwar Occupation, Trusteeship, Kim Il Sung, Armistice Negotiations, Juche

Introduction

It is perhaps not surprising that the United States has exerted hegemonic influence over Anglophone Korean studies, given the concentration of institutional and financial resources in the US and the country's dominant role in postwar Korea. Now, however, as the global balance of power has shifted, it is an auspicious time to examine how a framework built around American roles and perspectives has affected scholarship on Korea's modern history. This paper offers some observations about one aspect of this issue: how an over-emphasis on the US role has distorted our view of key events in the first years following liberation from Japanese rule. It looks first at the division of Korea from 1945–1947 and the establishment of a Communist state in the North. It then discusses the reasons the catastrophic inter-Korean war that began on 25 June 1950 was prolonged through two years of armistice negotiations. I argue that to the extent the United States has been placed at the center of the story of Korea's early postwar history while the role of the Soviet Union has been minimized, our understanding of these three events has suffered. Specifically, Anglophone scholarship has overestimated the possibility that the US and USSR could have compromised to avoid the division of the peninsula. In the same way, it has exaggerated Korean agency in creating a Soviet-style system in the North and has failed to apprehend the reasons the fratricidal war of 1950–53 was prolonged for two additional years after negotiations for an armistice began in July 1951.

The Division of Korea

As a singularly important event in Korea's modern history, the division of the country into two hostile states in the wake of World War II has been the focus of extensive scholarship. Until the 1990s, however, American scholars had access only to the US record of this tragedy and moreover were naturally concerned with documenting and analyzing the abundant failures of the American occupation. James Matray, for example, painstakingly lays out the convoluted process on the American side that eventually resulted in the creation of two states. However, with little knowledge of Moscow's decision-making, he assumes that the Soviets were open to cooperation on the issue and therefore overstates the possibility that the two occupying powers could have created a different outcome for Korea.¹

If we examine the Russian record along with the American one, the process that led to the division emerges as a series of hastily improvised solutions driven by mutual concerns about future security threats from Japan. The Soviets feared a Japanese or Japanese/American attack on the USSR via the Korean land bridge.

The Americans feared that Soviet control of Korea would propel the Japanese Communist Party to victory, thereby bringing Japan's latent but still considerable war-making capacity into the Soviet camp. As the two powers navigated the rapidly shifting environment at the end of the Pacific War, they took actions regarding the political settlement for Korea that were designed to forestall these eventualities.

As is well-known, at the allied conference at Potsdam in July 1945, the political settlement for Korea was not discussed but Soviet and American military leaders readily agreed that the Red Army would be responsible for defeating Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea—the role the US had been entreating the Soviets to play since the day after Pearl Harbor. However, by the time Soviet forces actually entered the Pacific war on August 9, State Department officials had become increasingly concerned about the political consequences of a Soviet occupation of the peninsula. They feared that a Korean government subservient to Moscow, like the one the Red Army had just created in occupied Poland, would increase the likelihood of a communist takeover of Japan, thus tilting the global balance of power in Moscow's favor.² Consequently, on the day after Soviet forces entered Manchuria and Korea, Washington tried to modify the Potsdam agreement so that US ground forces would occupy the southern half of the Korean peninsula.³

While American motivations for proposing the division are well-documented, we can only infer the reasons Joseph Stalin accepted this sudden change of plans. When the Soviet leader received the lengthy draft of General MacArthur's Order Number One governing the surrender of Japanese forces, which contained the proposal to create two occupation zones in Korea, he requested only two amendments: that all of the Kurile Islands be included in the Soviet zone, which clarified the Yalta agreement that the islands were to pass into Soviet possession, and that the northern half of Hokkaido be included in the area to be occupied by Soviet troops.⁴ Stalin accepted without comment the creation of an American zone in Korea, apparently calculating that this concession would improve his bargaining leverage on higher priority issues.⁵

We can glimpse how fluid Soviet thinking on Korea was at this time from the briefing paper the Foreign Ministry prepared for anticipated discussions of the Korea issue at the Council of Allied Foreign Ministers meeting that was to open in London on 11 September 1945. The Ministry viewed the American idea of trusteeship—to which Stalin had agreed in a private meeting with President Roosevelt during the Yalta conference in February 1945—as a mechanism through which the victorious powers would gain control over desired portions of Korea, as well as of other former Japanese territories. Since Moscow wanted to secure the sea lanes from Vladivostok to Port Arthur, the Soviet delegation was to demand exclusive

control over Pusan, Inchon, and Cheju Island, using as leverage the Americans' "wish to receive for themselves strategic regions in the Pacific Ocean." Should this demand be rejected, Moscow would propose joint Soviet–Chinese control of the strategic regions, extending the arrangement already made for the Manchurian Railway.⁶

The Foreign Ministry also hoped that the joint trusteeship over Korea would make it possible to gain control over additional Japanese territory by annexing it to Korea. Thus, the Soviet delegation in London was to demand that Tsushima be transferred to Korea, on the ostensible grounds that "throughout history" it "has served as a staging ground for aggressive actions by Japan against the continental countries and in particular against Korea." To overcome anticipated American resistance to this demand, Moscow would propose that an international trusteeship be established for the Pacific islands seized by Japan that the US intended to claim: Bonin, the Volcanos, Marianas, Carolinas, and Marshall Islands. The Soviet delegation would then offer to rescind this proposal in exchange for American acquiescence to their proposal for Korea.⁷

In the end, the Soviet delegation in London never put forward its proposals regarding Korea because Stalin, who guided Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov throughout the meeting via frequent telegrams,⁸ instructed his foreign minister to press insistently for his first priority—gaining a greater role in occupation policy for Japan. Molotov accordingly continued to raise the Japan issue, persisting even after Secretary of State Byrnes refused to place it on the agenda.⁹

American intransigence on Japan at the London meeting apparently persuaded Stalin that it would be useless to try to use trusteeship over Korea as a bargaining chip for territorial gains. Instead, without rupturing the cooperation with the United States that he needed in order to secure Soviet gains elsewhere, Moscow would move with dispatch to put in place structures that would guarantee lasting control over its occupation zone. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the eventual discussions with the Americans, at least the northern half of Korea would serve as a reliable buffer against future attack from Japan, as well as a readily available source of valuable economic resources.

To carry out this goal, Stalin's personal representative in Korea, Colonel-General Terentii F. Shtykov, established a Soviet Civil Administration to supervise political and economic affairs in the Soviet zone. Bruce Cumings and Charles Armstrong¹⁰ argue that the indirect rule the SCA established, in contrast to the direct military rule the Americans established in the South, indicates that Moscow had little interest in Korea. The Russian record, however, indicates just the opposite. Because of the importance of protecting against a future attack from Japan, the Soviets quickly put in place a native administration for their zone

that would secure Moscow's long-term interests beyond the period of military occupation.

Toward this end, Shtykov identified Korean communists loyal to Moscow, selecting, for lack of a better alternative, the small group of partisans who had fought with the Chinese communists in Manchuria and taken refuge in Siberia in 1941. He then moved carefully to establish a separate communist party organization for the Soviet zone, a step Koreans resisted since it suggested that Moscow intended to solidify the supposedly temporary division of the country.¹¹ He also quickly completed the simpler job of suppressing non-communist parties, followed by the establishment of a separate governing structure in November.¹²

By early December 1945, US-Soviet negotiations over allied control machinery for Japan had ground to a halt, with Moscow forced to accept Washington's refusal to grant a Soviet veto over occupation policy. At that point, US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes suddenly proposed that a second meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers be held in Moscow in just two weeks, so that the British, Soviet, and American diplomats could discuss the issues causing difficulties among them before the United Nations General Assembly convened in January. Molotov immediately agreed, ready to turn his attention to other areas, including Korea.

The discussions that led to the infamous Moscow Conference agreement on trusteeship are well-known from US records and from published Soviet documents,¹³ but Russian archival records reveal that by this time Soviet and American aims regarding Korea had hardened into irreconcilable goals. Thus, while American scholars are correct to note that the Truman administration was unwilling to cooperate with Moscow in creating a unified government for the peninsula, examination of Soviet decision-making shows that such cooperation was, in fact, impossible.

As it prepared to discuss the Korean issue at the Moscow conference, the Soviet Foreign Ministry faced a dilemma. It considered it politically inexpedient to oppose the establishment of a unified government for Korea but found it difficult to foresee a way to unify the country without jeopardizing Moscow's essential security requirements.¹⁴ As the briefing paper prepared for the Moscow meeting put it, "if Soviet policy is directed at the destruction of the military capability of the Japanese aggressors, at the eradication of Japanese influence in Korea, at the encouragement of the democratic movement of the Korean people and preparing them for independence, then judging by the activity of the Americans in Korea, American policy has precisely the opposite goal." The paper noted that the Americans had retained the old colonial administrative apparatus, with many Japanese residents and Korean collaborators left in leading posts, and had allowed Japanese residents to enjoy political rights and economic possibilities. Thus, the

“main obstacle to the restoration of the unity of Korea is the working out and realization of a single occupation policy,”¹⁵ the *sine qua non* of which was the exclusion of Japan from Korea.

A second problem, in Moscow’s view, was that a non-communist, American-influenced government in Seoul would inevitably pose the risk that the peninsula would be used as a bridgehead for a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. Therefore, “the question of whether Korea will in the future be turned into a breeding ground of new anxiety for us in the Far East” will depend on “the character of the future government of Korea.” The Foreign Ministry thus viewed the “multiplicity of political parties and groups” in southern Korea, “the lack of unity among them and the solicitations of the USA” as an obstacle to creating a Korean government of the character Moscow required.¹⁶

Nonetheless, the Soviet delegation had to propose some mechanism for creating a Korean government. Jacob Malik noted that the Cairo declaration promised the creation of an independent Korea, that all political and social groups within the country declare their desire to have their own government and are taking steps toward organizing one, and that the Americans support the establishment of a single governing organ, all of which made it politically inexpedient for the Soviet Union to oppose this step. Instead, Moscow should turn its attention to the composition of the government to be created, since “the character of this government will be one of the decisive factors in the determination of the future position of Korea from the point of view of our political, economic, and defense interests in the Far East.”¹⁷

The Foreign Ministry concluded that if a Korean government were created through an agreement between the USSR, the USA, and China (inexplicably omitting Great Britain), its composition would be unfavorable since the USA and China would support reactionary elements hostile to the Soviet Union. Instead, apparently confident of the strength of the leftists in the more populous South, the ministry recommended convening a Representative People’s Assembly elected through universal, secret, and equal voting, which would then create a government.

Malik elaborated a complicated set of steps the allies should take toward holding elections for a Representative Assembly. First, the four great powers (this time including Britain), must express support for Korean independence and for the creation of a provisional government elected with the participation of all social and political organizations. Given the proliferation of communist-backed mass organizations in the South, stipulating the participation of “all social and political organizations” would work in Moscow’s favor. Next, an elected provisional committee would prepare for the convocation of a constituent assembly,

which would then elect the government. To guarantee the participation of all strata of the population—the key to Moscow’s strategy—“broad democratic meetings” would be held in towns and villages and among sectors of the population, divided Soviet-style into workers, peasants, intellectuals, teachers, employees, and other groups, at which candidates for delegates and officeholders would be nominated and discussed. To control the process, a joint commission composed of Soviet and American representatives, and possibly Chinese and British, would supervise the meetings and elections.¹⁸

The Foreign Ministry also worked out plans to ensure control of the economic resources of the Soviet zone. As set forth in another briefing paper, Moscow would resume its confiscation of industrial plants by claiming as war trophies all Japanese military and heavy industry in Korea. These considerable properties were to be transferred to the Soviet Union as partial payment of reparations and as compensation for no less than “the huge damage inflicted by Japan on the Soviet Union throughout the time of its existence, including the damages from the Japanese intervention in the Far East from 1918 to 1923.”¹⁹

Since these confiscations could be imperiled if the Red Army’s closure of the sectoral border were lifted, it was necessary to deflect continued American attempts to do so, repeated most recently in a November 8 letter from Harriman to Stalin that reiterated the request for discussions on the resumption of trade, railroads, coastal shipping, establishment of uniform fiscal policies, solution of displaced persons, and other urgent matters. Viewing such issues as a matter of rival claims to Korean resources rather than an integral part of the creation of a unified government for the country, Malik recommended the creation of a Special Soviet–American Commission that would “resolve the immediate questions arising from the fact of the presence on the territory of Korea of Soviet and American troops.”²⁰

As negotiations proceeded in Moscow, Molotov responded to the initial American proposal with a counter-proposal that made use of the US formulation to ensure that the Soviet Union would be able to block any settlement in Korea it considered politically unacceptable. The Soviet proposal called first for the establishment of a provisional government that would “undertake all necessary measures for the development of industry, transportation, and agriculture,” thus allaying American concerns over the economic issues while stipulating that the creation of a government would precede rather than follow their resolution. Conflating Byrnes’ recommendation for a unified administration with the vague American formulations for trusteeship, the Soviets proposed that in forming this provisional government, the Koreans would be assisted by a Joint Commission composed of representatives of the Soviet and American commands, which,

before submitting recommendations to their respective governments, would consult with Korea's "democratic parties and social organizations"—a standard Soviet phrase that was the key to Moscow's strategy. With China and Great Britain omitted from the commission, Moscow would have one of two votes rather than one of four, and could therefore block the creation of a provisional government whose composition was not reliably "friendly" to Moscow.

Before the Joint Commission convened in March 1946, Shtykov's men moved quickly to establish the foundation for a Soviet system in the North by carrying out a thorough land reform. On March 5 the Provisional People's Committee passed a law decreeing the confiscation of land and implements belonging to Japanese, Korean collaborators, Koreans who had fled South, landlords who owned farms of a certain size or who did not farm the land themselves, and churches that owned more than a certain amount of land."²¹ Five weeks later Kim Il Sung reported to an enlarged plenum of the party's Organization Bureau that the land reform "has destroyed feudal relations in the countryside, and laid the foundation for the development of the entire economy of North Korea."²²

Having ensured that whatever the outcome of the Joint Commission meetings, at least the northern half of the peninsula would be "friendly" to the Soviet Union, the Foreign Ministry drafted a detailed description of the "democratic" state that must result from the Provisional Government that the Joint Commission was to create. After describing the administrative structure and voting procedures to be established, the directive laid out a political platform for the future Provisional Government, an ambitious socialist agenda within the Korean context: "1) Final liquidation of the remnants of the former Japanese rule in the political and economic life of Korea, the struggle against the reactionary anti-democratic elements within the country, forbidding the activity of pro-fascist and anti-democratic parties, organizations, and groups. 2) Realization of local self-government in the whole territory of Korea through the People's Committees, elected by the population on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret voting without discrimination by sex or religion. 3) Securing political freedom: freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, activity of democratic parties, professional unions and other democratic organizations. 4) Securing the inviolability of persons and domiciles, securing through law the private property of citizens. 5) Replacement of the legislative and judicial organs established by the Japanese rule; democratization of the legal organs. 6) Introduction of universal free and obligatory schooling in the native language; broadening the network of state primary, secondary, and tertiary schools. 7) Development of the national Korean culture. 8) Development of agriculture, industry, and transport to raise the people's wellbeing. 9) Confiscation of land belonging to the Japanese and to Koreans who

are traitors of the people, as well as large landowners, liquidation of the fulfillment system and transfer of all confiscated land without pay to Korean peasants. 10) Confiscation of irrigation systems belonging to the owners of the confiscated land, and its transfer without payment to the Korean state. 11) Nationalization of large-scale industry, banks, oil, forests, and railroad transport belonging to Japanese and Korean monopolies.²³ 12) Creation of a network of special schools for the preparation of cadres for the state apparatus, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, education, culture and health care. 13) Establishment of control over market prices, struggle against speculation and usury. 14) Establishment of a single just tax system, introduction of a progressive tax. 15) Introduction of an 8-hour working day for workers and employees and 6-hour working day for children from 13–16 years of age; forbidding exploitation of labor of children under 13 years of age. 16) Job security for workers and employees, establishment of a minimum wage. 17) Establishment of social insurance and introduction of protection of labor in enterprises. 18) Broadening the network of medical institutions, the struggle against epidemic diseases, and securing free medical care for the poor.”²⁴

Regarding the process for consulting with democratic parties and social organizations, the directive stipulated that the Joint Commission “must not consult with those parties and groups that speak out against the decision on Korea of the Moscow Conference of Three Ministers.” Since the only party that voiced support for the Moscow decision was the communist party, which did so on orders from Soviet officials, the Americans clearly would never accept this condition.²⁵ Nonetheless, the Foreign Ministry outlined details of the consultation process, ending with instructions for rebuffing any American attempt to discuss the economic unification of Korea. In such case, the delegation was to “explain that the exchange of goods between North and South Korea will be conducted according to agreement between the commanders of both zones of military responsibility in the form of mutual deliveries.”²⁶

In keeping with this directive, when the Joint Commission opened its meetings on March 20, the head of the Soviet delegation, Colonel-General Shtykov, stated that “the task of the US–Soviet Commission is to help the Korean people create a provisional Korean government capable of fulfilling the tasks arising from the democratization and reconstruction of the country. The future provisional Korean democratic government must be created on a basis of wide unification of all the democratic parties and social organizations supporting the decision of the Moscow Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Only such a government will be able to abolish entirely the remnants of the former Japanese domination in the political and economic life of Korea, to launch a decisive battle with reactionary

anti-democratic elements inside the country, to carry out radical measures in the rehabilitation of economic life, to give political liberties to the Koreans and fight for peace in the Far East. The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union.”²⁷

Unsurprisingly, the Joint Commission deadlocked over the issue of which parties to consult in the formation of the Provisional Government. The Soviet delegation would not compromise on its demand that the Commission consult only with groups that supported the Moscow Conference decision. Since this would mean that only the communist party and affiliated groups would be eligible to participate in the work of the Commission, the American delegation refused this demand. After repeated restatements of these irreconcilable positions, the Joint Commission adjourned May 8 *sine die*. Although it reconvened in 1947 and made some progress toward agreement on whom to consult, the small compromises the two sides made fell far short of what was necessary to create a provisional government. With Moscow determined to maintain the tractable government it had established in its zone in order to provide a reliable security buffer, and the Americans determined to establish their version of a friendly government in order to protect against communist takeover of Japan, the only possibility that remained was the creation of separate states in the South and North.

The division of Korea was thus the result of an improvised series of tactical moves by the two occupying powers that were designed to protect their security interests regarding Japan. Responsibility for this tragedy must be attributed equally to the Soviet Union and the United States; an exaggerated focus on the American role only obscures the history of the division.

The Formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

A US-centered perspective has also distorted scholarship on the creation of the DPRK, and hence on the well-springs of North Korea’s distinctive ideology. In the context of polarized politics in both the US and the ROK, a false dichotomy took root. If the American occupation of southern Korea was oppressive and chaotic, as it surely was, then the Soviet occupation of northern Korea must have been its mirror opposite. Thus, in his first book, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950*, Charles Armstrong details the creation of Soviet-style political, economic, and cultural structures in northern Korea, while arguing illogically that this process should be seen as an indigenous revolution, with the Soviet occupation merely providing the context. Moreover, Armstrong asserts that the supposedly nationalist

origins of the founding of the DPRK explain why it has outlasted the communist regimes the Red Army established in Eastern Europe.²⁸

Armstrong's determination to present North Korea in a particular way leads to striking failures of imagination, first of all concerning his sources. He bases his account primarily on the collection of documents US forces captured when they occupied the North in the fall of 1950. Following the example of Bruce Cumings, who used the captured documents to argue for North Korean agency in initiating the Korean War,²⁹ Armstrong fails to question a striking fact about this large collection: namely, that it contains very little documentation from high levels of the North Korean government and nothing whatever of interaction with or decisions by high levels of the Soviet government. If one were to approach the documents dispassionately, one would certainly notice this huge lacuna. Moreover, the reason for it would not be difficult to imagine. Soviet officials preparing to evacuate Pyongyang as UN/ROK forces advanced into the DPRK in October 1950 destroyed important documents rather than allow them to fall into American hands.³⁰ Consequently, while the captured documents provide valuable and extensive information on the activities of lower-level governing bodies and social organizations—records Soviet officials perhaps considered not important enough to destroy—they are far from providing an adequate view of the creation of governing structures in the North.

A second reason Armstrong exaggerates Korean agency in the creation of the DPRK is that he fails to take into account the political culture of the occupying power.³¹ The Soviet apparatus of the late Stalin era simply could not have taken a hands-off approach to the occupation of a strategically important territory that they were determined to transform into a reliable buffer. It should come as no surprise that Russian records reveal that Soviet officials in Moscow and Pyongyang exercised extremely close supervision of affairs in northern Korea. They drafted all laws for the new state, as well as Kim Il Sung's speeches, the marching order for parades, and decisions on even minor issues of politics and economics.³²

A third failure of imagination concerns the skill sets of the Koreans who staffed the new governing structures in the North. Much is made of the nationalist credentials of Korean Communists who spent the 1930s and early 40s as anti-Japanese guerilla fighters in Manchuria. However, regardless of how inspiring this background may be, it hardly equipped them to create the governing, economic, and social structures needed by a new state. The records on Korea held in the archive of the Soviet Foreign Ministry include a steady stream of urgent requests from Kim Il Sung to grant permission for groups of students to be admitted to Soviet institutes of metallurgy, railroad engineering, public health, etc. Partly to fill this gap in expertise, the occupation was structured so that an experienced

Soviet officer was responsible for monitoring the work of each department and approving each decision.³³

Records from the archives of the Foreign Ministry and Communist Party have revealed much about the occupation, but since it was conducted primarily by the Soviet Army, we need records from the archive of the Ministry of Defense to get a more granular understanding of these formative years. Fortunately, the Korean War Archive project at Korea University has begun to receive documents from this vast repository. They are being translated and will eventually become available on the project website. In the meantime, we can examine a thesis that has been written on the basis of some of these documents by Vasili Lebedev, who completed an M.A. at Korea University in 2018.³⁴

Lebedev examines the creation of the North Korean police, which was the first priority of Soviet occupation officials as they sought to establish order in the chaos that followed Japan's surrender. He documents how the Commandant offices that carried out the occupation at the local level were held responsible for all aspects of political and economic affairs in their region. Given the extreme centralization of decision-making, they forwarded requests for nearly all decisions to higher levels of the Soviet apparatus.³⁵ Two months into the occupation they carried out orders to disarm and disband all of the military and paramilitary groups Koreans had formed since liberation, confiscating thousands of weapons and enormous quantities of ammunition, sometimes against active resistance.³⁶ They then created a new police force, which was required to work "in accordance with the directives of the Soviet military command, which has its representative in the department. The head of the department is obliged to execute all orders and directives of the Soviet military representative."³⁷

Some Korean communists chafed at this level of control by their "fraternal" occupiers. Future Defense Minister Choe Yong-gon, who became head of the Police Department, exhorted the new police chiefs to "cooperate with the Soviet army," even though their "interference in administrative affairs is great and their meddling in our affairs is not small."³⁸ Nonetheless, the Red Army was creating what Korean communists had long hoped for—a transformation of their country according to Marxist principles. Moreover, at that point the international communist movement was still without question headed by the Soviet Union. It was only natural that throughout the occupation Korean party members willingly subordinated to Soviet officials, even on important issues such as unifying the country. Thus, for example, when Kim Il Sung received a proposal from Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik in March 1948 that leaders from North and South meet to discuss a plan to create a unified government, Kim Il Sung relayed the invitation to Shtykov, who then transmitted the information to Foreign Minister Molotov.

It was only after Shtykov received Molotov's approval that Kim Il Sung sent his affirmative reply to Seoul.³⁹

This willing subordination continued even after the occupation ended. As Kim Il Sung put it when he appealed to Soviet officials in January 1950 to allow him to discuss with Stalin his urgent desire to use military force to gain control of the South, he was "a Communist, a disciplined person, and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law."⁴⁰ I would argue that the prewar period is not where we find the origins of a distinctively Korean form of socialism. Instead, we should look at the profound transformation in attitudes toward the Soviet Union caused by the North Korean leadership's painful subjugation to Soviet and Chinese decisions during the catastrophic war of 1950–53.⁴¹

The Prolongation of the Korean War, 1951–1953

English-language scholarship on the unusually lengthy negotiations for an armistice in Korea, which lasted from June 1951 to July 1953, has detailed the slow course of the negotiations and identified the American demand for voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war as the main reason for the prolongation of the talks, after the two sides reached an agreement on the military demarcation line. The issue of POW repatriation was indeed the focus of extended discussions for fifteen months, which frustrated the American leadership to the point that the new Eisenhower administration threatened to use nuclear weapons against China to break the logjam.⁴² Western accounts of the negotiations tend to assume, perhaps naturally, that the two sides approached the talks in good faith, both wishing to reach an agreement to end the war.⁴³ However, Soviet records reveal that for the Communist side, the armistice negotiations had a very different purpose.

By January 1951, with Chinese forces having eliminated the danger that the UN command might destroy the Soviet security buffer in Korea, Stalin began to regard the war as advantageous to the Soviet Union. By keeping the Americans bogged down in Korea for another two to three years, the Soviet bloc states of Eastern Europe would have time to build powerful military forces with which to buffer the USSR against anticipated attack from the West. Consequently, the Soviet leader summoned the top political and military officials of the European fraternal states to Moscow to discuss the opportunities created by the American failure in Korea. Crowing that the US is "unable even to cope with a small war such as the one in Korea," Stalin declared that "the fact that the US will be tied down in Asia for the next two or three years constitutes a very favorable circumstance for us," which the fraternal states must use to create "modern and powerful military forces."⁴⁴

To ensure that the US would remain bogged down in Korea, Stalin informed Mao Zedong when the armistice talks resumed in November 1951 that the Soviet leadership “considers it correct that the Chinese/Korean side, using flexible tactics ... continue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.”⁴⁵ Accordingly, the North Korean and Chinese representatives at the talks refused to accept any terms advanced by the Americans. By early 1952, however, the North Korean leadership began to voice a desire to bring to an end the destruction their country was suffering from American bombing. On 16 January Foreign Minister Pak Hon-Yong communicated to Peng Dehuai that “the Korean people throughout the country demand peace and do not want to continue the war.” However, ever a loyal communist, Pak added that “if the Soviet Union and China consider it advantageous to continue the war, then the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party will be able to overcome any difficulties and hold their position.”⁴⁶

In July Kim Il Sung raised the issue of ending the war with Mao Zedong, who had concluded that the war was not only beneficial to the Soviet bloc, but also to People’s Republic of China. Kim Il Sung argued that even though the enemy’s demand for voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war was unreasonable, “we need simultaneously to move decisively toward the soonest conclusion of an armistice, a ceasefire and transfer of all prisoners of war on the basis of the Geneva Convention.”⁴⁷ Mao refused to yield, however, writing to Kim Il Sung that “when the enemy is subjecting us to furious bombardment, accepting a provocative and fraudulent proposal from the enemy, which does not signify in fact any kind of concession, is highly disadvantageous to us.” The only harmful consequence of rejecting the enemy proposal will be further Korean and Chinese losses, but since China began to aid Korea, the Korean people have been standing “on the front line of defense of the camp of peace of the whole world.” Moreover, through the sacrifices of the Korean people, both North Korea and Northeast China have been defended from American aggression. Mao declared euphemistically that “the people of Korea and China, especially their armed forces, have received the possibility of being tempered and acquiring experience in the struggle against American imperialism.”⁴⁸ The war was in fact performing the essential service of transforming the People’s Liberation Army from a guerilla army into a modern military force, as Soviet advisers trained Chinese units to use the advanced weapons the Soviets sent to Korea and created modern logistical and communication systems for the Chinese forces.

Mao further emphasized to Kim Il Sung the international importance of the war in Korea, asserting that the increased might of the Korean and Chinese people in the course of this war “is inspiring the peace-loving peoples of the whole world

in the struggle against aggressive war and is facilitating the development of the movement for defense of peace throughout the world." This international support "limits the mobility of the main forces of American imperialism and makes it suffer constant losses in the East." Moreover, with US forces bogged down in Korea, the Soviet Union, "the stronghold of peace throughout the world," can accelerate its rebuilding from World War II and "exercise its influence on the development of the revolutionary movement of peoples of all countries. This will mean the delay of a new world war."⁴⁹

With the international stakes so high, Mao Zedong admonished his Korean "younger brother" that to accept the enemy's proposal "under the influence of its bombardment" would put China and North Korea in a disadvantageous position both politically and militarily. Rather than bringing any lasting peace, it would encourage the enemy to make new provocations. Since the Koreans and Chinese would then be in a disadvantageous position, they would possibly fail to rebuff the new enemy provocations. In that case, the advantages the war has brought to the global struggle against American imperialism will be lost. Consequently, even if the enemy does not make a concession and the negotiations are further delayed, or if the enemy breaks off the negotiations, Korea and China must continue military operations until they find "a means for changing the present situation."⁵⁰

China's Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai discussed the status of the war in talks with Stalin the following month, reporting that the North Koreans were ready to end the war by accepting the UN offer to return 83,000 POWs.⁵¹ He reported that Mao Zedong believed they should hold firm in their demand that all POWs be repatriated, but the Koreans "believe that the continuation of the war is not advantageous because the daily losses are greater than the number of POWs whose return is being discussed." Mao, in contrast, "believes that the continuation of the war is advantageous to us, since it detracts the USA from preparing for a new world war."⁵²

Stalin agreed with Mao's view and dismissed the Koreans' concerns with the memorable comment that they "have lost nothing, except people."⁵³ The Chinese and Koreans do not need to accept the American terms, Stalin declared, because the US knows it will have to end the war. The communist allies must therefore endure and be patient. "Of course," he conceded, "one needs to understand Korea—they have suffered many casualties. But it needs to be explained to them that this is an important matter. They need patience and lots of endurance. The war in Korea has shown America's weakness. The armies of twenty-four countries cannot continue the war in Korea for long, since they have not achieved their goals and cannot count on success in this matter."⁵⁴

It may be that Stalin decided to end the war in early 1953, as Wada Haruki argues.⁵⁵ In any case, once the Soviet leader died on 5 March 1953 the collective leadership that took power in Moscow moved with dispatch to bring the war in Korea to an end. On March 19 the Council of Ministers adopted a lengthy resolution on the war, with attached letters to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung outlining the statements their delegation should make to indicate their willingness to resolve the outstanding issues in order to reach an armistice.⁵⁶ The Chinese leadership had by then also decided to bring the war to an end and therefore welcomed the Soviet initiative, as Zhou Enlai communicated to his allies while he was in Moscow for Stalin's funeral.⁵⁷ The efforts of South Korean President Syngman Rhee to sabotage the conclusion of an armistice delayed its signing until July, as the Chinese leadership felt the need to respond with a demonstration of strength and secure a favorable position for the dividing line. Nonetheless, the turning point in ending the war was the decision of the Soviet leadership to finally conclude an armistice.

American demands during the armistice negotiations were certainly important in prolonging the war, as they shaped Soviet and Chinese calculations about how the war could be used to enhance the prestige of the communist side internationally, as well as build domestic support for the government in Beijing. They also affected the United States' relations with its wartime allies and its position in the larger Cold War. Scholars will surely be occupied for generations with the daunting task of understanding the catastrophic war of 1950–3. As they proceed, they will need not only to continue to expand the source base but also the intellectual framework, anticipating that very different processes may be driving the actions of the states involved.

Conclusion

This brief discussion of some aspects of the Soviet role in Korea in the early postwar years suggests some ways that a US-centric framework has distorted our view of basic issues in contemporary Korean history. It has clouded both the scholarly and public understanding of the division of the country by exaggerating the American contribution to this tragedy. The assumption that a unified government could have been created if only the US had only been more willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union fails to acknowledge the power Moscow had to obstruct such an outcome, and its determination to do so if necessary for Soviet security. The issue here is not where to place blame, but rather how to understand the combination of circumstances, perceptions, and actions that brought about the division.

With regard to the state created in the north of Korea, the US-centered approach has had convoluted and long-lasting consequences. In the context of the binary politics of the Cold War era, by keeping the spotlight on the serious harm the American occupation did in the South many scholars, as well as the left-leaning portion of public opinion in the South, have understated the control Soviet occupation authorities exercised in the North. The resulting exaggeration of Korean agency in the establishment of the DPRK has then led to a failure to understand the driving force behind the North's distinctive ideology. Thus, for example, Benjamin Young's valuable new book, *Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader*,⁵⁸ presents a wealth of new information about North Korea's involvement in the Third World but takes at face value the DPRK's relentless focus on Kim Il Sung's history as an anti-Japanese guerilla fighter. Young consequently depicts Pyongyang's promotion of a *Juche* ideology of national autonomy, anti-imperialism, and self-reliance as a response to the experience of Japanese rule.

A more persuasive explanation for *Juche*, I would argue, is that while the legacy of Japanese rule remained important, from the late 1950s the North Korean leadership was driven primarily by resentment of the more recent and still ongoing danger of Soviet imperialism. If we apprehend the degree to which Kim Il Sung and his circle began their time in power with a willing subordination to the communist "Vatican," then we can appreciate the intensity of their response when the Soviet leader betrayed their trust during the war of 1950–53. In October 1950, when Mao Zedong informed Stalin that they would not intervene in Korea without Soviet air support, the Soviet leader ordered Kim Il Sung to evacuate his forces from the peninsula rather than provide such support. Stalin revoked this order the following day, after learning that the Chinese had changed their mind, but he allowed Soviet air force units to protect only the Yalu River corridor, not the bulk of DPRK territory. In 1952 the Soviet leader refused the North Koreans' request to bring an end to the war that was causing extraordinary physical destruction of their country because he viewed the conflict as beneficial to the Soviet Union. He furthermore insisted that the Koreans subordinate themselves to the decisions of the Chinese leadership, who similarly regarded the continuation of the war as important to their own security. With this background in mind, it is easier to understand why Kim Il Sung described Soviet intervention in 1956 as an attempt to destroy the party from within.

In conclusion, as the field of Korean studies considers the lessons to be learned from Charles Armstrong's egregious plagiarism of Balázs Szalontai's work, we can see, first of all, the crude imperialism of a highly placed American scholar falsifying his footnotes in order to claim as his own the work of a young historian from Hungary. But we can also observe that Armstrong's extraordinary misconduct arose from his recognition that East European archival records were

essential for writing North Korea's history. An appropriate response to the scandal, therefore, would be to broaden the field by encouraging and embracing the work of scholars from a wide range of countries and academic backgrounds.

Notes

1. See James Matray. *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 75–98. See also Bruce Cumings. *Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History* (New York, NY: Norton, 2005), pp. 186–197. These scholars have held to these interpretations despite the release of Soviet documentation, much of which has been translated into English. See, for example, the paper James Matray presented at a conference on the division of Korea held at Korea University in August 2015.
2. United States Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume II*, Paper no. 732, "Trusteeship for Korea" from Henry Stimson, p. 631.
3. United States Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): Diplomatic Papers, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, 1945, Volume VI*, Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Draft Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," p. 1039.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, Volume II* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957): p. 266. A copy of the telegram Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov sent to the Soviet ambassador in Washington on 17 August 1945, communicating to Truman Stalin's reply to the draft of General Order No. 1, is found in the Dmitrii Volkogonov Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, DC, Reel 18.
5. For an excellent discussion of Soviet goals at the end of the war with Japan, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 2006).
6. "Notes on the Question of Former Japanese Colonies and Mandated Territories," September 1945. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF AVIPRF), Fond фонд 04311, Opis опись 1, Delo Дело 52, Папка Папка 8, Listy Листы 40–43. The author of the paper is not indicated, but the document is included in the files labeled proposals and notes of Tsarapkin.
7. *Ibid.*
8. For a well-documented account of Stalin's behind the scenes role during the London meeting, see Vladimir Pechatnov. "The Allies are Pressing on You to Break Your Will ...' Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members, September 1945–December 1946," Working Paper No. 26, *The Cold War International History Project* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars).
9. For records of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see *FRUS, 1945, Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters*, pp. 99–559.
10. Bruce Cumings. *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Charles Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2003): pp. 52–57.
11. See the detailed and persuasive account of the creation of a separate party organization found in Hak S. Paik, "North Korean State Formation, 1945–1950" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1993), Part I, pp. 119–135.

12. Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee. *Communism in Korea, Part I* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1972), p. 332.
13. See *FRUS, 1945, Volume II*, pp. 579–821; *The Soviet Union and the Korean Question (Documents)* (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948), pp. 7–10.
14. Jacob Malik. “On the Question of a Single Government for Korea,” 10 December 1945. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 0102, Opis 1, Delo 15, Папка 1, Listy 18–21.
15. Petukhov, Adviser to the Second Far Eastern Department. “Soviet–American Occupation of Korea and the Question of Economic and Political Ties Between North and South Korea.” December 1945. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 0102, Opis 1, Delo 15, Папка 1, Listy 8–10.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. Suzdalev. “A Report on Japanese Military and Heavy Industry in Korea,” December 1945. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 0102, Opis 1, Delo 15, Папка 1, Listy 22–29.
20. Jacob Malik. “On the Question of a Single Government for Korea.”
21. E.I. Shabshina. “Koreia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny,” *Akademiia nauk SSSR. Krizis kolonial'noi sistemy, natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia bor'ba narodov vostochnoi asii* (Moskva, Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo akademii nauk SSSR, 1949), p. 262.
22. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории (RGASPI РГАСПИ), Fond 17, Opis 128, Delo 205, Str. Стр. 7–12.
23. Small enterprises and immovable property that formerly belonged to Japanese residents in Korea and was officially seized by Koreans with the approval of the Soviet and American commands after the capitulation of the Japanese armed forces will not be subject to nationalization.
24. March 13, 1946. Lozovsky to Molotov. “Draft directive to the Soviet delegation at the Joint Soviet/American Commission on the Formation of a Provisional Korean democratic government.” Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 18, Opis 8, Delo 79, Папка 6, Str. 4–11. The final draft of the directive is found in AVPRF, Fond 07, Opis 11, Delo 280, Папка 18.
25. See *US Army Handbook for Korea* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 38; Jounghoon Alexander Kim. *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–1972* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 62.
26. *Ibid.*
27. United States Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): The Far East, 1946, Volume VIII*, “Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State,” [740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–2246: Telegram], pp. 652–654.
28. Charles Armstrong. *The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950*. Kim Young Jun repeats this interpretation in *Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: People's Army and the Korean War* (London: Routledge, 2017).
29. Bruce Cumings. *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947*.
30. It is obvious from the contents of the collection that this is so, but the Presidential Archive documents on the war also include a specific reference to this destruction of documents.
31. A particularly vivid example of this culture of centralized control is the thick file on Pak Hon-yong's request to visit the Lenin Library when he was in Moscow for medical treatment in 1949. The request, which one would think would be rather routine, passed

- through numerous levels of the apparatus before it was finally approved by none other than a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
32. The records of the Korea section of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party, held in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, include original drafts and revisions of speeches Soviet officials wrote for Kim Il Sung, laws for the northern zone, and countless policy instructions to the Korean leadership. For specific examples, see Kathryn Weathersby. "Making Foreign Policy Under Stalin: The Case of Korea," in Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen and Erik Kulavig, eds., *Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 224–240.
 33. *Ibid.*
 34. Lebedev is preparing a condensed version of the thesis for submission in article form.
 35. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Центральный архив Министерства обороны (TsAMO ЦАМО). Fond Military Komandatury of North Pyongan Province, Opis 536317, Delo 19, List 55. Cited in Vasilii Lebedev. "In Search of Law and Order: Soviet Occupation of North Korea and the Creation of the North Korean Police Force (1945–1946). Thesis for the Master's Degree, Department of History, Korea University, June 2018.
 36. TsAMO, Fond 234, Opis 3213, Delo 54, Listy 160–162. Cited in Lebedev. "In Search of Law and Order: Soviet Occupation of North Korea and the Creation of the North Korean Police Force (1945–1946)."
 37. "The basic provisions on the organization and work of the police organs in North Korea." TsAMO, Fond USGASK, Opis 343253, Delo 3, List 28. Cited in Vasilii Lebedev. "In Search of Law and Order: Soviet Occupation of North Korea and the Creation of the North Korean Police Force (1945–1946).
 38. TsAMO, Fond USGASK, Opis 342253, Delo 3, Listy 43–44. Cited in Lebedev. "In Search of Law and Order: Soviet Occupation of North Korea and the Creation of the North Korean Police Force (1945–1946).
 39. March 13, 1948. Shtykov and Tunkin to Molotov. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 0102, Opis 4, Delo 18, Папка 8, Listy 1–3.
 40. Ciphered telegram from Shtykov to [Foreign Minister] Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950. Archive of the Foreign Relations of the Russian Federation (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Папка 11, Listy 87–91.
 41. See Kathryn Weathersby. "North Korea and the Armistice Negotiations," *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch*, 90 (2016): 21–46.
 42. See Roger Dingman. "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," *International Security* 13.3 (Winter 1988/1989): 50–91; Rosemary Foot. "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security* 13.3 (Winter 1988/1989): 92–112.
 43. See, for example, Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); William Stueck. *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Walter Hermes. *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1966); James Matray, "Progress and Paralysis: The Korean Truce Talks, July 1951 to May 1952," in Mark Wilkinson, ed., *The Korean War at Fifty: International Perspectives* (Lexington City, VI: Virginia Military Institute, 2004).
 44. Notes by Emil Bodnarus on the meeting with Stalin in Moscow, 9–12 January 1951, published in C. Cristescu, "Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide inarmarea Romanei" [January 1951: Stalin Decides to Arm Romania], *Magazin Istoric* (Bucharest), 10 (1995): 15–23.
 45. Polithuro decision of 19 November 1951, approving the attached answer to Comrade Mao Zedong, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828[9], Listy 42–43, and Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней

- политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Папка 11, Delo 5, List 64. For the text of the document, see Weathersby, “New Russian Documents,” p. 72. For a more extensive discussion of the Soviet role in prolonging the armistice negotiations, see K. Weathersby “North Korea and the Armistice Negotiations.” The following discussion draws from this article.
46. Ciphred telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin] 8 February 1952 conveying telegram of 22 January 1952 from Peng Dehuai to Mao and 4 February 1952 reply from Mao to Peng Dehuai. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, Listy 81–83. For the text of the document, see Weathersby, “New Russian Documents,” pp. 75–76.
 47. Ciphred telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin via Razuvaev, 16 July 1952, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 65–68 and Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Папка 11, Listy 40–43. For the text of the document, see Weathersby. “New Russian Documents,” p. 77.
 48. Ciphred telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin] 18 July 1952, conveying the telegram from Mao to Kim Il Sung on 15 July 1952 and the reply from Kim to Mao on 16 July 1952. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Listy 72–75 and Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Папка 11, Listy 90–93. For the text of the document, see Weathersby “New Russian Documents,” pp. 78–79.
 49. *Ibid.*
 50. *Ibid.*
 51. Record of Conversation between Comrade I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 329, Listy 54–72. Translation by Danny Rozas. For the full text of the document see “Stalin’s Conversations with Chinese Leaders,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): 10–14.
 52. Record of Conversation between Comrade I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952, p. 12.
 53. *Ibid.* Translation by the author.
 54. *Ibid.*
 55. Wada Haruki. *The Korean War: An International History*, translated by Frank Baldwin (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014): chapter 7, “The Armistice,” pp. 257–292.
 56. USSR Council of Ministers Resolution, March 19, 1953. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (AVPRF АВПРФ), Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, Listy 60–71.
 57. For the full text of this document, see *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993): 15–17.
 58. Benjamin Young. *Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021).